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Abstract:  This study focuses on the stock market impact of Japanese corporate 
decisions to adopt pension plans.  Implementing corporate pension plans in Japan is 
complicated because they are heavily regulated by the government, and the traditional 
lump-sum-only severance benefit plan already exists, requiring interfacing the newly 
adopted plans with the existing ones.  Using the GARCH estimation method, the market 
model applied in this paper for the relatively long period 1975-1995 yields evidence that 
suggests that the stock market responds to some of the more specific characteristics of 
adopted plans.  Alternative specifications of the pension “event” also suggest that 
relatively little of the market impact comes from public announcement about pension 
adoption occasioned by the release of the firm’s financial statement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Since the publication of the American Accounting Association’s A Statement of 
Basic Accounting Theory in 1966, there have been major developments in the economic 
theory of accounting that emphasizes the informational content of accounting and its 
impact on the financial market.  An important strand of empirical research that it has 
spawned, the semi-strong efficient capital market hypothesis originated by Fama (1970), 
encompasses analyses of the informational content of corporate earnings, as well as that 
of depreciation and other accounting methods employed by firms.  For example, Ball 
(1972), and Biddle and Lindahl (1982) analyze the tax consequences and stock price 
reactions to the firm’s decision to adopt the LIFO inventory valuation method.  These 
studies generally support the view that the financial market effectively utilizes 
accounting information, particularly as it relates to tax consequences.1 
With respect to the stock market impact of corporate pensions, Feldstein and 
Seligman (1981), Daley (1984), and Bulow, Morck and Summers (1987), among others, 
analyze the relationship between unfunded pension liabilities and share prices, and find 
that unfunded vested pension liabilities adversely affect the market valuation of the 
firm.  The findings are consistent with the underlying hypothesis, since an unfunded 
pension liability increases the firm’s future obligations at the same time that it foregoes 
current corporate tax benefits associated with pension plans.2  In addition, Alderson 
and Chen (1986), VanDerhei (1987), Moore and Pruitt (1990), and Alderson and 
VanDerhei (1992) examine whether and how the termination of over-funded plans 
impacts positively on share prices.  Both the evidence and the argument regarding this 
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latter linkage are more mixed.  Interestingly, however, Mittelsteadt and Regier (1993) 
find evidence that when over-funded defined benefit plans are terminated, share prices 
tend to rise, causing a positive wealth transfer to share holders, whereas defined-
contribution plans that cannot be “over-funded” have no such effect.   
While the preceding studies using the U.S. data have analyzed the effect of either 
unfunded or over-funded pension liabilities of firms that already have plans in place, 
none has analyzed the effect of corporate decisions to adopt plans in the first place. This 
may not be surprising in view of the fact that corporate pension plans are fairly 
widespread among American corporations, with some plans dating back to the 1920s.3  
In contrast, Japanese plans have been adopted more recently, albeit in a heavily 
regulated economic environment.  The maintained hypothesis underlying this study is 
that the adoption of pension plans by Japanese corporations (in the form of either the 
tekikaku or kosei variety as explained in the following section) signals information about 
expectations of future earnings, which in turn impacts positively on their share prices. 
The primary incentive for a corporation to adopt a pension plan, relative to the 
alternative of relying solely on the traditional lump-sum payment plan, is the greater 
tax advantage associated with the newly adopted pension plan.  This advantage, 
however, cannot be realized without sufficient corporate earnings from which the plan’s 
future premium contributions will be deducted as an expense, and the adoption 
decisions have this informational content about future earnings expectations.  On the 
other hand, the cash-flow position of the firm is affected by pension decisions in a more 
complex manner, depending on a) how the existing lump-sum payment obligations are 
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transferred to the new plan, b) the terms of the new plan stipulating the schedule of 
benefits, and the periodic premium contributions required for the firm to maintain the 
plan, and c) the administrative cost of carrying the plan.  We trace briefly the evolution 
and the characteristics of alternative Japanese plans, and the interactions between the 
plans.  Our focus is on the stock market response to the corporate pension initiatives, as 
the transition is made from internally administered lump-sum severance plans to 
externally managed explicit pension plans.      
 
JAPANESE CORPORATE PENSION PLANS AND THEIR INCENTIVES  
 The Japanese pension system is fairly complex, so we briefly describe the major 
plans covering private sector employment.4   The traditional practice of retirement 
compensation is based on one-time, lump-sum payments that are linked to the retiring 
employee's years of employment at the firm and the salary level.  Since similar 
payments at reduced rates are also made routinely to employees leaving the firm for 
non-retirement reasons, including a voluntary quit, the practice may be best understood 
as an implicit contract on all types of severance benefits.  This long-standing practice 
was institutionalized by the 1952 revision of the Corporate Tax Laws.  The hikiate kin 
(severance reserve, or hikiate for short) system was introduced, allowing participating 
firms to set up an internal reserve account on severance compensation.  However, firms 
are under no legal obligation to actually set aside the reserve as either cash on hand or 
funds to be portfolio-managed as the firm’s severance liabilities are accumulated over 
time, and most of the hikiate plans have in fact remained unfunded.  Despite this, the 
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law allowed periodic “contributions” to the reserve account as the firm's legitimate 
expense.  Hence, this tax provision has given a powerful incentive for Japanese 
corporations to set up the plan, but restrictions were soon imposed on the amount of tax 
deductions that can be claimed.5   
 A subsequent corporate tax legislation, passed in 1962, introduced a voluntary 
tax-qualified pension called zeisei tekikaku nenkin (tekikaku plan for short) under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  This legislation grew out of increasing 
concerns about the rapidly rising unfunded indemnity of most hikiate plans.  In contrast 
to the hikiate plan, the tekikaku plan entails the establishment of an explicit pension 
plan to be managed by an outside financial contractor, either a trust bank or a life 
insurance company.6   The benefit levels are defined by each plan, and once established, 
the firm's periodic premium contributions as determined by the contractor, subject to 
the MOF regulation and reviewed every five years, are fully tax-deductible.  By the end 
of 1995, there were 91,465 tekikaku plans covering 10.8 million employees.7    
 In the meantime, revisions of the Japanese social security system made in 1965 
resulted in an alternative corporate pension called kosei nenkin kikin (employee pension 
funds, or kosei plan for short).  The initiatives in this case were taken by the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, which became increasingly concerned about the financial health of 
the national social security system that it administers.  The new legislation was designed 
to shift the administration (tax collection, management of collected funds, and benefit 
payouts for eligible employees) of a portion of the earnings-linked old-age public 
pension in the social security system to individual kosei plans that are set up by 
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participating corporations.  Hence, the kosei plan administers both this portion of social 
security benefits and the more substantial private pension portion.  In return for the 
partial absorption of the public pension, the participating corporation receives a tax 
rebate.  However, once set up, portfolio management of the plan is by an independent 
contractor subject to the same rules as the tekikaku plan, and the firm's premium 
contributions to the plan are also fully tax-deductible.  Because of the legal restriction 
that the qualifying plan must enroll at least 500 employees, however, the kosei plan is 
limited to larger firms.8  There were 1,878 kosei plans as of 1995, covering 12.1 million 
employees.  
 The primary corporate incentives for adopting either the tekikaku or kosei plan 
are the more favorable tax treatment that they both receive over the hikiate plan.9  The 
adoption of either of these new plans may therefore contain useful information to the 
stock market: the firm expects to maintain at least sufficient earnings in the future, 
against which all premium contributions can be applied as an expense with resultant tax 
savings.   
 
THREE FORMS OF TRANSFER FROM THE HIKIATE PLAN 
 Retiring employees are typically given the option of receiving retirement benefits 
either in a lump sum, or as pension income for a predetermined period, or in some 
combination of lump-sum payments and pension income.  The period over which 
pension income is paid after retirement varies in tekikaku plans and is an option given 
to the employees, but it is by law for life in kosei plans.   However, the transfer from the 
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hikiate plan, which virtually all listed firms carried at least initially, to either tekikaku or 
kosei plans can take one of three different routes.   
In zenmen ikou (zenmen transfer for short), the hikiate plan is completely 
dissolved and replaced by the newly adopted plan, which assumes the liabilities to pay 
for the accumulated benefits of the hikiate plan.  The main advantage of this option for 
the firm is three-fold.  First, with the dissolution of the hikiate plan, the firm is freed 
from the considerable administrative and accounting details involved such as 
periodically updating the account, determining the amount of eligible tax credits, and 
paying benefits for both retirement and non-retirement severance whenever employees 
leave the firm.  Second, there is the tax advantage that comes from the higher 
deductibility of future premium contributions to the new plan as compared to what the 
hikiate plan alone will have allowed.  Third, the firm is freed from lump-sum 
settlements on accumulated non-retirement severance benefits whenever eligible 
employees leave the firm.  Such settlements are made directly by the managed plan.  
Despite these merits, the majority of Japanese corporations have not chosen this route, 
mainly because it requires commensurately higher premium payments to cover the 
accumulated indemnity of the replaced hikiate plan.10 
Alternatively, firms may elect yokowari ichibu ikou (meaning “horizontal partial 
transfer,” or ichibu transfer for short), transferring some portions of the hikiate 
severance benefits to the new plan.  Under this option, the hikiate plan is partially 
dissolved as the new plan is implemented, which then assumes fiduciary responsibilities 
for the transferred benefits.  The tax advantage, therefore, is smaller than the zenmen 
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transfer, because tax credits for the remaining hikiate plan are lower than the new plan 
for an equivalent level of future benefits covered.  However, many firms elect this 
option because they may feel that it offers a temporary cash-flow advantage over the 
zenmen option, in that its premium payments are less.  The risk for the firm, of course, 
is that it must finance the non-transferred portion of severance payments in a lump sum 
whenever eligible employees leave the firm, and the non-retirement severance is 
unpredictable. 
 The third option is teinen ikou (“transfer of retirement benefits,” or teinen 
transfer for short), under which the existing hikiate plan is retained, and the new plan is 
set up to provide for the payment of only the retirement benefits that include both 
pension and non-pension benefits.  The limit on tax credits allowed in the hikiate plan is 
pro-rated by law to the non-retirement severance payments.11  Therefore, corporations 
electing teinen transfer are able to claim the same amount of tax deductions for 
maintaining the hikiate plan as before the transfer, because the transfer does not affect 
the non-retirement severance indemnity that is used for computing the deductibility 
limit.  Premium contributions to the new plan, in the meantime, are fully tax-deductible.  
Consequently, this redundancy in tax shelter generally gives the teinen option the 
largest tax advantage among the three options.12  In addition, since the new plan using 
this option covers only the retirement benefits, the required premium payments are less 
than the zenmen option.13   However, all non-retirement accumulated severance benefits 
must be paid in a lump sum as before.  Table 1 summarizes the three forms of transfer 
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available among the tekikaku and kosei plans with respect to the tax merit and the cash 
burden on the firm. 
     [Table 1 near here] 
 
THE TIMING OF PENSION PLAN’S ADOPTION 
 Planning for the tekikaku plan typically begins in earnest at least a year in 
advance of its formal adoption.  The chief financial contractor, either a life insurance or 
trust bank agency, is chosen during this planning period, and it draws up a detailed 
schedule of the terms of the pension plan in accordance with the mandate given by the 
contracting firm.  This is the phase in which information regarding the firm’s intentions 
begins to be transmitted to the market.  Upon final approval by the firm’s management, 
typically between 30 and 60 days prior to the plan’s implementation, the plan’s 
contractor applies for a permit to execute the plan from the National Tax Office of the 
Ministry of Finance on behalf of the contracting firm. This permit is granted routinely.  
The public announcement of the firm’s decision to implement the new pension plan, 
however, does not occur until the release of the firm’s financial statement that typically 
takes place three months following the end of the fiscal year.   The announcement of the 
pension plan is made in a footnote to its financial statement.   
 The kosei plan takes a somewhat longer preparatory period, typically two to 
three years in advance of its actual implementation, because of the more cumbersome 
procedural requirements.  The Ministry of Health and Welfare requires submission of 
detailed documents pertaining to the plan for preliminary examination by its pension 
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office, followed by a formal hearing on the proposed plan.  The official justification is 
that a detailed scrutiny is warranted because the kosei plan is by law entrusted with the 
responsibility to absorb and carry a portion of the social security retirement benefits.  
Based on the outcome of the hearing, an informal permit called naininka is granted, 
which allows the firm to proceed with the formal permit application, to which the 
consent of the firm's labor union representatives must be affixed.  Once the informal 
permit is granted, the rest of the process takes approximately three months until the 
financial terms of the plan are worked out with the chosen contractor, whereupon the 
plan is implemented.  Public notice of the adoption is given in the government 
publication Kanpo, approximately one month after the plan’s formal adoption.  The 
firm's financial statement released typically three months after the end of the fiscal year 
also contains a footnote announcement in the same manner as the tekikaku plan. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
Given the extensive governmental regulation bearing on the establishment and 
the management of the Japanese corporate pension plans,14 and the complexity of the 
pension system as a whole, does the firm’s pension adoption still contain useful 
information to which the stock market responds?  And given the long planning process 
involved in the Japanese corporate decision regarding pension adoption, how long prior 
to, as well as subsequent to the plan’s adoption does the market respond, if ever?  By 
adopting either the tekikaku or kosei plan, the firm must also decide on the particular 
form of transfer from the hikiate plan in place to one of the alternative new plans.  Of 
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the three types of transfer available, the ichibu transfer is the least advantageous in 
terms of tax benefits, and the teinen offers the largest tax savings for the same level of 
total benefits covered.  Does the market response go so far as to differentiate among 
these transfer options of the adoption decision?   
 Consistent with the maintained hypothesis as stated in the introductory section, 
the empirical issues to be investigated can be summarized by the following null 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 (null):  The timing of pension adoption decisions has no effect on the stock 
market.     
Hypothesis 2 (null):  The stock market is indifferent among the three forms of the plan’s 
transfer options. 
 
THE ESTIMATION METHOD 
 We estimate the stock market impact of pension decisions using monthly 
prediction errors from the market model.  The model assumes that the individual share 
price reflects all available information, including the market-wide information that 
affects the entire stock market.  Hence, we must separate the impact of firm-specific 
information such as pension adoption from the market-wide informational impact in 
arriving at our estimate of abnormal returns.  We estimate these returns for each 
company on a monthly basis, beginning at the thirty-fifth month (t = -35) prior to the 
event month through the eleventh month following the event (t = +11).  The choice of 
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this relatively long "window" is motivated by the time frame of the Japanese corporate 
pension decision process. 
 For the specification of the event month, we use the following three alternatives. 
Event “A”:  the month in which the new pension plan is formerly adopted 
(implemented). 
Event “C”:  the month in which the plan’s chief financial contractor draws up the plan 
with detailed terms of the plan, following the mandate given by the firm’s top 
management.  This occurs typically one month prior to the plan’s formal adoption 
among the tekikaku plans, and three months prior to adoption among the kosei plans. 
Event “P”:  the month in which the financial statement of the firm is released, 
containing public announcement about the adoption of a new pension plan .  This 
occurs typically three months after the end of the fiscal year.15  Hence, as an event 
month, this lags behind the adoption month (event “A”) by 3 to 14 months. 
 An abnormal return (i.e., prediction error) on firm i's equity share (Eit) for 
month t is calculated as the difference between the observed return and the return 
predicted by the market model: 
Eit  =  Rit  -  (Ai  +  Bi Rmt)        (1) 
where  
t  =  the month index for the test (prediction) period, -35, ..., 0, ..., +11, with t = 
0 for the event month  
 Rit =   the natural logarithm of the rate of return of the common stock of firm i  
at the end of  month t 
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 Rmt =   the natural logarithm of the average rate of return of common stocks 
evaluated from the JSRI (Japan Securities Resource Institute) index of 
stock prices 
 Ai, Bi  =  the firm's estimated parameters of the market model obtained from the 
preceding four-year estimation period, t= -83, …, -36. 
 
 The average abnormal return for the test month t is given by 
       N 
  AEt  =   ( ∑ Eit) / N        (2) 
      i=1          
 
where N is the number of firms in the sample.  The cumulative average abnormal 
returns, CAT, are then the sum of AEt over the test period: 
          T 
 CAT =      ∑  AEt        (3) 
              t=-35 
 
where T = -35, ..., 0, ..., +11. 
 
 As is now well recognized in the literature, stock returns generally exhibit time-
varying volatility, and hence the OLS estimates of the market model are inefficient.  For 
this reason, Bera, Bubnys and Park (1988), for instance, use the market model relying 
on the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) process.  For this study, 
we apply the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) 
estimation method originally developed by Bollerslev (1986, 1987), using the 
GARCH(1,1) version as follows:  
Ei t =  Ri t  -  (Ai + Bi Rm t) 
Ei t /ψi t-1 ∼  τ (0, σ2it, ν)        (4) 
 14
σ2it =  ai 0 + ai 1 E2i t-1 + b i 1 σ2i t-1 
where ψi t-1 is the set of all information through time t-1 on firm i (i =1…N); τ is the 
student-t distribution with zero mean, variance σ2it, and ν degrees of freedom; and Ai , 
Bi, ai0, ai1, bi1 are the maximum-likelihood estimates of the true parameters.16  The 
algorithms we use for estimation are the Version2 of Eviews. 
We first test the statistical significance of AEt and CAT.  We then estimate the 
regression of CAT on the available pension information including the types of transfer 
adopted, controlling for the firm's earnings variable.  
 
THE DATA USED 
 The period chosen for this study spans over twenty years, from January 1975 
through March 1995.   The choice of this period is motivated by (1) the availability of 
company data on the status of pension plans adopted, (2) the critical period in the 
Japanese corporate history when explicit pension plans in the form of either the 
tekikaku or kosei plan began to be adopted in earnest, and (3) a period sufficiently long 
to include the development and the subsequent collapse of the major speculative bubble 
in the Japanese stock market.  In particular, we are motivated in (3) by the question: 
Are the efficiency implications of the market model with respect to corporate pensions 
borne out generally despite the market upheaval associated with the bubble 
phenomenon?   
We examined the financial statements of all 1,152 companies listed in the First 
Sections of the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya Stock Exchanges excluding banks, finance 
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and insurance businesses.  Of these companies, 1087 had corporate pension plans, but 
the date of adoption could not be ascertained for 393 companies which were thus 
excluded from our sample.  Among the remaining 694 companies we found 408 adopted 
either tekikaku or kosei plans during the period covered.  But this list contains 80 
companies that were not listed on the exchanges at the time of the plan’s adoption.  
Excluding these companies, our final list contains 328 companies, 267 carrying the 
tekikaku plan, and 61 the kosei plan.  Tables 2 and 3 present the distribution of these 
companies by industry and the adoption year, respectively. 
    [Table 2 near here] 
    [Table 3 near here] 
 The data used for this study are from Nihon Shoken Keizai Kenkyusho (Japan 
Securities Resource Institute), generally recognized to be the best source on stock prices, 
dividend payments, issuance of new shares, new listings, de-listing, and other changes in 
the listed companies.               
 
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Table 4 presents the estimated AEt and CAT assessed at monthly intervals for the 
328 firms with pension plans.  Positive and statistically significant (at least at the 5% 
level) average abnormal returns are obtained in a substantial number of cases, 17 
suggesting that the market does react favorably to information regarding the pension 
adoption over the relatively long period.   The cumulative abnormal returns are 
statistically significant every month at the 1% level from t= -25 forward (to t= +11) in 
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the adoption event, and from t= -24 forward in both the contract and public 
announcement events.  The positive and statistically significant cumulative effect that 
remains several months beyond the event month suggests that the information’s impact 
is substantial. 
[Table 4 near here] 
 Graph 1 presents the plot of cumulative average abnormal returns.  The top 
three in the graph correspond to the three series of cumulative returns reported in table 
4.  This result, however, does not control for the effect of corporate earnings that have 
been shown to affect stock prices.18  Accordingly, we conduct a pair-match analysis for 
a comparative purpose:  for each corporation that has either the tekikaku or the 
kosei plan, another corporation carrying only the hikiate plan that most closely matches 
the control firm's earnings in the same industry is chosen.19  The bottom three series in 
the graph show deviations in the cumulative returns between the control firm and its 
paired match.  They point to the presence of statistically significant cumulative returns, 
after controlling for the effect of earnings.20  
[Graph 1 near here] 
 We report in table 5 the result of regression analysis that focuses on explaining 
the cumulative abnormal returns for different sub-periods surrounding the event 
month, controlling for corporate earnings.21  The regression is a pair-match analysis, 
where the paired match is selected by applying the same earnings criteria as in the 
preceding paragraph.  Hence, 656 (= 2x328) firms are entered into the regression 
analysis.  Finally, in order to correct for possible cross sectional correlations in the stock 
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returns that may bias the regression estimate, we apply White’s method (1980) for 
heteroskedasticity correction. 
[Table 5 near here] 
 The dependent variable CA(m,0) is the sum of abnormal returns cumulative 
over the period, t=m through the event month.  We report results from several sub-
periods, to convey a sense of the time frame when the pension information appears to 
make an impact on the market.  It is clear that the earnings variable plays a dominant 
role in explaining the abnormal returns as it is highly significant in all cases.  
Controlling for this variable, however, we find that the dummy variable for pension 
enters positively in each regression, with statistical significance at the 5% level in the (-
23, 0) and (-11,0) period except for the event month “P”.   
It is of considerable interest, therefore, to examine if the choice among the 
transfer options that firms elect makes a difference.   Accordingly, we report the result 
of another regression that differentiates among the three forms of transfer.  As it turns 
out, both the teinen and zenmen transfers register a statistically significant result at 
least at the 5% level in the (-23, 0), as well as (-11, 0) period associated with the adoption 
(“A”) and contract (“C”) event months.  Pension adoption with the ichibu transfer, 
however, fails in the significance test in all cases, indicating that pension adoption with 
this option did not produce a statistically meaningful impact.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the more limited nature of tax savings under the ichibu transfer fails to 
induce a favorable market response.  Moreover, the public announcement (“P”) event 
occasioned by the release of the financial statement is in effect a non-event in terms of 
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market response in the more immediate (-11, 0) period preceding the announcement, 
regardless of the transfer options chosen.  Evidently, the lateness of this event, lagging 
behind the adoption event by up to 14 months, renders this period devoid of 
informational impact on the stock market.  This is consistent with the notion that 
pension information effectively leaks to the market through more private channels such 
as the choice of financial contractors and the implementation of the plans. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The Japanese corporate pension system may appear to be both complex and 
obtuse, reflecting the heavy dose of governmental regulations, as well as the difficulties 
involved in integrating different plans that have evolved from separate origins.  There 
are different ways in which the more traditional hikiate plan with lump-sum severance 
pay is either replaced or interfaced with the newly adopted explicit pension plans.  We 
have presented evidence that suggests, however, that the decision to adopt an explicit 
pension plan induces the stock market response that is also sensitive to the particular 
forms of transfer options adopted.  Moreover, our evidence suggests that this response 
pre-dates the release of the firm’s financial statement by a substantial period, limiting 
the impact of this particular event in the more immediate months preceding the public 
announcement.  The two null hypotheses, therefore, stand to be rejected. 
 There are a number of additional implications of our findings for further inquiry.  
The extensive U.S. pension economics literature has emphasized tax incentives and the 
tax consequences of corporate pension, and has also addressed the stock market impact 
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of the funding status (in terms of being either unfunded or over-funded) of the existing 
plans.  Our findings on Japanese corporate pension are consistent with the efficiency 
implications of new pension adoptions based on tax incentives.  But in contrast to 
American corporations, Japanese pension plans may be best characterized as “under-
funded” with virtually no case of an over-funded pension.  Also in contrast to the U.S. 
plans, there is no insurance coverage for Japanese corporate pensions, save instances of 
a limited insurance coverage in some kosei plans.  But the kosei insurance coverage is 
voluntary, unlike the American pension plans that must carry insurance under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.  To what extent, if any, 
does the difference in insurance coverage and the public policy regarding pension 
insurance explain the gap in the funding status of pension between the two countries? 
 We have also shown that the market responds positively to the choice of either 
the zenmen or teinen option that has a greater tax advantage than the ichibu transfer.  
Indeed, the ichibu option fails consistently in our statistical test, suggesting that the 
market assesses its adoption in effect as non-event.  But one major difference that exists 
in economic characteristics between the zenmen on one hand, and teinen (and ichibu to a 
lesser extent) on the other, is the fact that the latter contains an important risk element 
that is absent in the former.  That risk, of course, stems from the uncertainty in the 
timing of non-retirement severance of employees and the typically large cash 
settlements of accumulated severance benefits that comes with it.  In the zenmen option, 
all such payments are handled by the managed plan, sparing the firm from a sudden 
and unanticipated cash drain.  The firm’s regular premium payments under the zenmen 
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option, therefore, contain this implicit insurance premium.  However, only a small 
number of Japanese corporations have elected the zenmen option (see table 3), 
suggesting that the insurance premium paid in this form is perhaps too high.  There has 
never been an explicit insurance market developed in Japan addressing this particular 
risk assessment on the corporate cash-flow position.  This issue, therefore, remains to be 
explored further.      
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1 In this vein, Beatty (1995) also finds that employee stock ownership plans impact positively on 
stock prices through the tax advantage they offer, as well as their ability to serve as a deterrent 
against hostile takeovers.  With respect to the Japanese financial market, Kohmura (1987) 
focuses on the depreciation method adopted by firms and its financial market impact, and Ito 
(1989) on the impact of dividend information, both finding a positive impact.  Sakakibara, 
Yamaji, Sakurai, Shiroshita, and Fukuda  (1988) find evidence that suggests that the Tokyo 
Stock Market is "informationally efficient, at least with respect to unconsolidated earnings 
information" (p.90).   
 
2  See Tepper and Affleck (1974) and Tepper (1981), in particular. 
 
3 The 1926 revision of the Internal Revenue Code introduced provisions allowing pension 
premium contributions as a deductible corporate expense.  Corporate pension plans became 
prevalent in the U.S. after the Second World War.  See American Council of Life Insurance 
(1987), p.33. 
   
4 See Clark (1991), for example, for more details. 
 
5 Subsequent regulation stipulated that the cumulative credits must not exceed 40% (tightened 
further to 20% since 1998) of lump-sum compensation that would be payable at the end of each 
year if all employees were to quit voluntarily in that year.  To illustrate, suppose that a firm has 
the total severance indemnity of 1 billion yen in a given year − the payment that it will incur if 
all its employees were to quit in that year.  The maximum hikiate credit that can be claimed as 
an expense to be deducted from its corporate income is limited to the difference between 400 
million (= 40% of 1 billion) yen and the cumulative total deductions claimed in the past.    
 
6 Commercial banks and brokerage houses were prohibited until recently from managing 
private pension funds. 
 
7  The figures are from Raifu Dezain Kenkyusho (1999), p. 17. 
 
8 Prior to 1986, the minimum enrollment requirement was 1,000 employees per plan, which was 
reduced to 700 in 1986, and to 500 in 1989 where it has remained. 
 
 26
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 We conducted a questionnaire survey of all manufacturing firms listed in the First Section of 
Tokyo Stock Exchange during the months of August and September 1995.  The response we 
received indicated that more than 60% of 134 companies that returned the questionnaire listed 
tax and the related cost advantage as the primary reason for adopting pension.  The format of 
the questionnaire we sent follows that of larger-scale surveys conducted earlier by Seimei Hoken 
Bunka Senta (Life Insurance Cultural Center) for the year 1992 which also indicated a similar 
pattern of response regarding the primary reasons for adopting the respective plans.  Our 
survey result is available upon request to the authors.  
  
10 However, the firm does not have to fund this indemnity with lump-sum premiums 
immediately upon transfer to the new plan.  Under the current practice, this can be done with 
premium payments stretched over a period spanning from 6 to 30 years. 
    
11 See footnote 5. 
 
12 Murakami (1999), p.8. 
 
13On average, premium payments under the teinen option are approximately 80% of the 
premiums paid under the zenmen option for a typical employee covered by each plan.  See Dai-
ichi Seimei Hoken Sogo Kaisha, p. 104.  
 
14 Until the recent deregulation, for instance, the government stipulated that for the purpose of 
assessing the future indemnity of the plan, it must set the expected rate of return on premium 
contributions at 5.5% per annum.  Another regulation, known as the 5-3-3-2 rule, stipulated 
that at least 50% of the plan's assets must be in government or other low-risk bonds, no more 
than 30% in stocks, no more than 30% in foreign investments, and no more than 20% in real-
estate investments. 
    
15 Fiscal year ends March 31 for the majority of Japanese corporations.  However, some also use 
June 30, September 30, or December 31 as the end date of their fiscal year. 
  
16 Corhay and Rad (1996) also use the same process in the market model estimation. 
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17 The z-statistic (with standard normal distribution) used for testing the null hypothesis takes 
into account the increase in variance due to prediction outside the estimation period, following 
Theil (1971), pp.122-123.  For the derivation of the z-statistic for cumulative prediction errors in 
the market model, see Patell (1976), p.257. 
     
18 See, for example, Ball and Brown (1968) and Strong and Walker (1993) for the U.S., and Sato 
et al. (1979) and Kunimura (1979) for Japanese studies.  Kunimura’s study, in particular, 
presents evidence in support of Fama’s semi-strong form hypothesis on the relationship between 
earnings forecast and the stock price. 
 
19 We define the earnings variable as change in the annual rate of return on capital preceding 
the adoption month. 
 
20 We selected a random sample of firms that carry only the hikiate plan, in order to see if there 
is any baseline tendency for abnormal returns to accumulate over time.  Using 50 firms, and 
three different benchmark “event” months, we detected no evidence of a systematic trend bias. 
  
21 For the importance of controlling for the earnings variable in the regression specification, see 
Salamon and Kopel (1993). 
 
TABLE 1.  THREE FORMS OF TRANSFER FROM HIKIATE TO TEKIKAKU OR KOSEI PENSION PLANS 
 
 
     ZENMEN  Transfer   ICHIBU  Transfer                 TEINEN  Transfer 
 
 
Benefits transferred:  All severance (retirement plus non-          Portions of severance (retire-    Retirement benefits only. 
retirement) benefits.                                    ment plus non-retirement)   
     benefits.    
 
Status of the hikiate plan Dissolved.                     Partially dissolved.       No change − the hikiate plan    
after transfer:                            remains in place. 
 
Corporate income tax  All premium contributions      Premium payments for the trans-     Premium contributions to the 
advantage:   are tax-deductible.                   ferred portion of severance bene-     plan plus eligible hikiate credits 
                fits and the eligible hikiate credits     are tax-deductible.  The most 
for the remaining portion of the      tax-advantageous among the  
hikiate plan are tax-deductible.             three options.  
The least tax-advantageous  
among the three options. 
   
               
Pre-retirement funding Premiums for all severance benefits         Premium payments for the trans-     Premium payments for retire- 
burden to the firm:   (both retirement and non-retirement)      ferred portion of benefits plus     ment benefits on the regular  
    paid on the regular basis.  Premium        lump-sum payments for the remain-    basis plus lump-sum payments 
    payment requirements are the          ing portion whenever severance     for all non-retirement severance.  
largest among the three options.     occurs. 
 
 
Funding requirements for None. (All payments are met by the     Must fund the non-transferred     Lump-sum retirement payments  
the firm when employees externally managed plan.)      portion of retirement benefits.     for the remaining hikiate plan.  
retire:                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.  DISTRIBUTION OF PENSION PLANS BY INDUSTRY 
 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Industry              Tekikaku  Plan    Kosei Plan           Total 
 _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Agriculture, forestry, fisheries 
  and mining    5  1             6 
    Construction               17  6           23 
    Foods               16  6           22 
    Textiles     2  2             4 
    Pulp and papers    8  0             8 
   Chemicals               33          6                     39 
   Oil, coal, rubber, glass, clay & stones           21  1           22 
   Ferrous metals              17  1           18 
    Non-ferrous metals    4  2             6 
    Metal products    7  1             8 
    Machinery               29  2           31 
    Electric tools               26            18           44 
    Transportation equipment             14              2           16 
    Precision instruments   6  1             7 
    Other manufactures    7      5           12 
    Commerce               16  6           22 
    Real estate     6  0             6 
    Transportation and communications           23  1           24 
    Utilities (electricity & gas)   1  0             1 
    Services     9  0             9 
 
    TOTAL             267             61         328
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.  DISTRIBUTION OF PENSION PLANS BY ADOPTION YEAR 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  YEAR                 Tekikaku Plan                                    Kosei  Plan   _                      
          Zenmen    Ichibu     Teinen         Total     Zenmen    Ichibu    Teinen      Total 
__________________________________________________________________________________
   
 
   1975               3     5       0            8                0             2         0             2   
   1976               0     2       0            2    1       4         1             6 
   1977               2     2             3            7    2       2         0             4 
   1978               4       5             2              11         0              3             5               8      
   1979               2       4            9              15    0              2             2               4
  
   1980               6             11     17           34                0              4             1               5   
   1981               0       6           15              21               1              2             0               3  
   1982               1     8     10              19             0       4         0               4  
   1983               1        9        8              18                0             5             0              5   
   1984               1        5     11              17      0              1             0               1
  
   1985               1       8       9              18        0              3             0               3 
   1986               0     9       9              18             1              1             0               2 
   1987               0         7     12              19                1              2             0                3        
   1988               2       4       4              10              1              1             0               2 
   1989               1       6       6              13              0              3             1               4       
 
   1990               1    11       4              16    0       2         0             2      
   1991               2      4       2            8    0       1         0             1        
   1992               3      1       1            5    0       1          0             1    
   1993               0      2       2            4    0       0         0             0      
   1994               0      3       0            3    0       1         0             1      
 
   1995               0      0       1            1    0       0         0             0
   
 
TOTAL            30  112   125        267                7     44        10             61      
__________________________________________________________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.  AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (AE) AND THEIR  
        CUMULATIVES (CA): 
    ALTERNATIVE EVENT MONTHS 
 
 
Month       Event “A”                   Event “C”            Event “P”      
  AE         CA           AE         CA             AE          CA   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  -35          - 0.466 a       - 0.466 a         - 0.174      - 0.174           - 0.079        - 0.079 
  -34            0.653 a        0.187         - 0.166 c      - 0.339 b             0.386 c          0.307 
  -33          - 0.166         0.021           0.654 a        0.315           - 0.202          0.105 
  -32            0.180        0.202         - 0.333 c      - 0.018             0.175          0.283 
  -31          - 0.290       - 0.089           0.248        0.231             0.142          0.422 
 
  -30            0.418        0.329           0.024        0.255             0.225          0.647 
  -29            0.645 c          0.974           0.567 b        0.822             0.168          0.815 
  -28            0.229        1.203           0.280        1.102             0.549 b         1.364 b 
  -27            0.524        1.726            0.199        1.301           - 0.068         1.296  b 
  -26            0.227        1.953 b           0.615 b        1.916           - 0.132         1.164 
 
  -25            0.815 a        2.768 a           0.185        2.101 c             0.505         1.669 b 
  -24            0.444        3.212 a           0.894 a        2.995 a             0.760 a         2.429 a 
  -23            0.076        3.288 a           0.408        3.403 a           - 0.068         2.361 a 
  -22            0.560 c        3.848 a           0.206        3.608 a             0.292 c         2.653 a 
  -21            0.281        4.130 a           0.642 b        4.250 a             0.009         2.662 a 
 
  -20            0.344         4.473 a           0.406        4.656 a             0.172         2.834 a 
  -19            0.191        4.664 a           0.429 c        5.084 a             0.100         2.935 a 
  -18            0.409 c        5.073 a           0.121        5.206 a           - 0.060         2.874 a 
  -17          - 0.178        4.895 a           0.356        5.562 a             0.754 a         3.628 a 
  -16            0.280        5.175 a         - 0.203        5.359 a             0.792 a         4.420 a 
 
  -15            0.281        5.456 a           0.399 c        5.759 a             0.222         4.642 a 
  -14            0.207        5.663 a           0.336        6.095 a           - 0.302         4.340 a 
  -13            0.315        5.978 a           0.310        6.406 a              0.807 a         5.148 a 
  -12            0.051        6.029 a           0.260        6.665 a             0.255 b         5.403 a 
  -11            0.184        6.213 a         - 0.192        6.473 a             0.301         5.704 a 
 
  -10            0.356        6.569 a           0.310        6.783 a             0.633 a         6.337 a  
  - 9            0.388        6.957 a           0.533 c        7.317 a           - 0.013         6.324 a 
  - 8            0.572 b        7.529 a           0.396        7.713 a             0.237         6.561 a 
  - 7            0.777 a        8.306 a           0.423 c        8.136 a             0.145         6.706 a 
  - 6          - 0.028        8.278 a           0.605 b        8.741 a           - 0.152         6.554 a 
 
  - 5            0.768 a        9.046 a           0.140        8.881 a             0.048         6.602 a 
  - 4            0.230        9.276 a           0.654 a        9.535 a             0.734 a         7.336 a 
  - 3            0.372        9.648 a           0.302        9.837 a             0.054         7.390 a 
  - 2            0.265        9.914 a           0.437 b      10.274 a           - 0.160         7.230 a 
  - 1            0.720 a      10.634 a           0.132      10.406 a             0.448 c         7.678 a 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Continued 
 
 
Month       Event “A”                   Event “C”            Event “P”      
  AE         CA           AE         CA             AE          CA   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    0          - 0.210       10.424 a           0.863 a      11.268 a             0.219         7.896 a 
 + 1            0.329       10.752 a         - 0.154      11.114 a           - 0.341 c         7.555 a 
 + 2             0.333       11.085 a           0.203      11.317 a             0.212         7.767 a 
 + 3            0.015       11.100 a           0.303      11.620 a             0.010         7.777 a 
 + 4            0.402 c       11.503 a           0.175      11.796 a           - 0.343 c         7.433 a 
 
 + 5            0.131       11.634 a           0.475 b      12.270 a           - 0.149         7.284 a 
 + 6          - 0.139       11.495 a           0.064      12.334 a           - 0.036         7.248 a 
 + 7          - 0.073       11.422 a         - 0.064      12.270 a             0.218         7.466 a 
 + 8          - 0.139       11.283 a           0.088      12.358 a             0.443 c         7.909 a 
 + 9            0.058       11.341 a         - 0.236      12.121 a             0.452 b         8.361 a 
 
 +10            0.617 a       11.958 a           0.046      12.167 a           - 0.101         8.260 a 
 +11          - 0.151       11.807 a           0.468 b      12.636 a             0.402 a         8.662 a 
 
 
 
The superscripts following the estimated values indicate statistical significance at 1% (a), 5% (b), 
and 10% (c), respectively, using the two-tailed critical z-value. (See footnote 17 for more detail.)  
Events “A”, “C” and “P” designate the plan’s adoption month, the contract completion month, 
and the month of financial statement release, respectively.   
 
 
 
TABLE 5.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS, PENSION-PLAN (D=1) VS. PAIR-MATCHED 
 
HIKIATE-ONLY (D=0) CORPORATIONS: ALTERNATIVE EVENT MONTHS 
 
 
 
  Dependent                    Pension        Corporate          D times       D times         D times        Adjusted              Sample     
   Variable                Constant       Dummy (D)          Earnings          Zenmen           Ichibu   Teinen             R2       F-Value   Size 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EVENT “A”:  THE PLAN’S ADOPTION MONTH 
 
CA(-35,0)         5.976 a        2.807 c           3.309 a              0.078         28.62 a     656  
         (4.117)       (1.288)          (4.563) 
           5.984 a                    3.281 a  6.103         1.094     3.897 c    0.077            14.63 a    656 
         (4.117)            (4.521)                 (1.185)        (0.419)   (1.286) 
 
CA(-23,0)          3.565 a        2.959 b           2.201 a                0.070            25.71 a    656 
          (2.861)       (1.679)          (3.134) 
           3.569 a                    2.157 a  7.417 b         0.451    4.661 b   0.073         13.97 a     656 
          (2.861)            (3.108)             (1.670)       (0.217)   (2.051)         
 
CA(-11,0)          1.708 b         2.419 b                  1.211 a       0.062            22.47 a    656 
          (2.054)       (2.106)          (5.594) 
           1.704 b                         1.197 a  5.304 b        - 0.249    4.728 a 0.073          13.95 a    656 
          (2.047)            (5.515)             (1.905)       (-0.187)   (3.153)         
 
 
EVENT “C”:  THE PLAN’S CONTRACT COMPLETION MONTH 
 
CA(-35,0)         6.733 a        2.825            3.449 a       0.082          30.24 a     656  
         (4.591)       (1.277)          (4.436) 
          6.737 a                    3.438 a  9.875 b         1.248    2.720  0.083             15.85 a    656 
         (4.587)            (4.406)                 (1.896)        (0.473)   (0.886)         
 
 
Table 5 -  Continued 
 
  Dependent                    Pension        Corporate          D times       D times         D times        Adjusted              Sample     
   Variable                Constant       Dummy (D)          Earnings          Zenmen           Ichibu   Teinen             R2       F-Value   Size 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CA(-23,0)          4.305 a        3.250 b           2.301 a           0.074         27.27 a    656 
          (3.367)       (1.811)          (3.084) 
           4.308 a                    2.260 a  10.336 b         1.024    3.903 b   0.079         15.02 a     656 
          (3.366)            (3.060)             (2.254)         (0.483)   (1.715)                  
 
CA(-11,0)          2.218 a         1.961 b                  1.634 a       0.066         24.10 a    656 
          (2.575)       (1.682)          (4.916) 
           2.212 a                         1.579 a  8.093 a        - 0.642    3.337 b 0.081          15.34 a    656 
          (2.567)            (4.780)             (2.872)        (-0.486)   (2.169)         
 
 
EVENT “P”:  THE STATEMENT RELEASE MONTH 
 
CA(-35,0)         4.213 a        2.238            2.915 a             0.061         22.16 a     656  
         (2.710)       (1.035)          (4.983) 
          4.223 a                    2.884 a  1.458         1.064    3.822 c  0.059         11.25 a    656 
         (2.712)            (4.927)                 (0.317)        (0.399)   (1.345)        
 
CA(-23,0)          2.058 b        2.813 b           1.908 a       0.064            23.32 a    656 
          (1.753)       (1.763)          (4.038) 
           2.060 b                    1.882 a  4.565 c         1.323    4.070 b       0.063         12.06 a     656 
          (1.752)            (4.010)             (1.395)        (0.677)   (1.981)         
 
CA(-11,0)          1.543 b         0.737                     0.969 a       0.042         15.30 a    656 
          (2.110)       (0.707)          (5.248) 
           1.544 b                         0.975 a  - 0.310         0.295    1.528  0.040           7.86 a    656 
          (2.109)            (5.259)             (-0.159)        (0.226)   (1.098)        
 
 
CA(p,q) is the sum of abnormal returns over the period (month p to q).  The superscripts following the estimated values indicate statistical 
significance at 1%( a), 5%( b), and 10%( c), respectively.  The t-values are in parentheses.  
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